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Abstract
We revisit the question of why fertility behaviors and educational decisions appear
to vary systematically across ethnic groups. We assess the possibility that diﬀerences
in fertility across groups remain even though their socio-economic characteristics are
similar. More speciﬁcally, we consider that parents’ fertility decisions are aﬀected by
the uncertainty concerning the future economic status of their oﬀ-spring. We assume
that this uncertainty varies across groups and is linked to the size of the group one
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potential for social mobility while small minorities have lower fertility.
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11 Introduction
Diﬀerences in fertility behavior and educational attainment between minority and ma-
jority populations around the world are persistent and have existed during most of
history. Ethnic minorities are often found to exhibit higher fertility levels and lower
educational investments than the majority counterpart, it is however the contrary in
some cases. For instance, in the U.S. in 2006, the Black and Hispanic minorities had
a completed fertility rate1 of respectively 2.003 and 2.300 children, while the White
had 1.765 and the Asian 1.689. As already ascertained in the quality/quantity trade-
oﬀ literature, fertility is inversely related to educational investment in children. Data
for 20062 gives that 81.7% of the Black and 59.3% of the Hispanic were high school
graduates or more, while 86.1% of the White and 87.4% of the Asian3.
Socio-economic characteristics of parents, by which we intend level of income and
education, are often thought to drive diﬀerences in fertility. More educated and/or
wealthier parents may have a higher opportunity cost of raising children and thus
prefer smaller families. It could also be that educated parents have a higher taste for
educated children. They thus make less children but invest more in their education.
In both cases, if characteristics of parents converge then so do the fertility rates. In
de la Croix and Doepke (2003, 2004) for instance, diﬀerences in fertility collapse as
inequality across households disappears. In this view, persistent diﬀerentials in fertility
and educational investment therefore arise only if socio-economic characteristics do not
converge across groups.
More recently, an emerging strand of the literature has underlined the important
role of culture in fertility choices. Fernandez and Fogli (2005, 2006) ﬁnd that cultural
proxies are signiﬁcant determinants of fertility controlling for socio-economic charac-
teristics. For instance, fertility and labor force participation rates in the origin country
of migrants or number of siblings of parents have been found to be signiﬁcantly cor-
related to fertility decisions of migrant women in the US. In this view, diﬀerences in
fertility may persist as beliefs and norms of diﬀerent groups evolve diﬀerently than
1Number of children ever born to 1000 women aged 40-44. Source: U.S. Census Bureau.
2Source: U.S. Census Bureau.
3These diﬀerentials become even bigger when we look at the proportion of college graduates or more.
2socio-economic characteristics. In this paper, we do not deny the potential eﬀects of
culture, nevertheless we depart from this kind of explanation in order to check whether
an economic mechanism, other than parental characteristics, may be useful to explain
the remaining cross-race diﬀerences in fertility.
In our opinion, uncertainty about future economic conditions of children may be
a potential determinant of diﬀerences in fertility behaviors. The literature on endoge-
nous fertility already introduced uncertainty, but in a diﬀerent fashion. Kalemli-Ozcan
(2003) builds a stochastic model where the number of surviving children is a random
variable. She ﬁnds that the risk stemming from the loss of a child generates a precau-
tionary demand for children that leads parents to overshoot their desired fertility. A
key result is that an exogenous decrease in the infant mortality rate reduces the uncer-
tainty faced by parents and thus decreases the precautionary demand for children in
favor of educational investment. On the other hand, Hondroyiannis (2010) documents
that uncertainty about macro-economic variables may be detrimental to child-bearing
as responsible parents would not decide to have one more child if they were to face a
high risk of unemployment or low income in the future. He uses a panel data of Euro-
pean countries to show that measures of economic uncertainty such as output volatility
and the unemployment rate are negatively related to total fertility rates. In such frame-
works, the fact that groups face diﬀerent levels of uncertainty would explain persistent
fertility gaps.
The sociological literature has viewed the behavior of minorities in terms of fertility
and educational decisions from two complementary perspectives. The ﬁrst, known as
assimilation or characteristics hypothesis asserts that diﬀerences in fertility arise from
diﬀerences in socio-economic achievement. According to this view, as a minority group
reaches the socio-economic characteristics of the majority group, fertility diﬀerences
disappear4. A second approach, namely the minority status hypothesis, argues that
minority group membership can have an independent eﬀect on fertility. This theory,
as formulated in the seminal work of Goldscheider and Uhlenberg (1969) admits the
relevance of socio-economic factors in explaining diﬀerences in fertility behaviors be-
4See for instance Gordon (1964, 1978), Ryder (1973), Bean and Marcum (1978), Bean and Swicegood
(1985), Trovato (1987) for an exhaustive discussion on the social characteristics hypothesis in sociology.
3tween majority and minority groups, but highlights the importance of several other
factors: desire for social and economic mobility, psychological insecurity, segregation,
intragroup and intergroup socio-economic relationships, that may induce fertility dif-
ferences to persist even though socio-economic characteristics of the minority converge
towards those of the majority.
In this view, belonging to a minority has an independent eﬀect on fertility. One
possible reason might be the presence of barriers to minorities for upward economic
mobility. These obstacles may lead minority members to modify their fertility and
educational investment in order to compensate for potential limitations to economic
achievement even when social, economic, and demographic attributes for majority and
minority populations are very similar. On the one hand, according to Goldscheider and
Uhlenberg (1969) ’the residual lower fertility of minority groups may result from the
insecurity associated with minority group status’. This mechanism of fertility limita-
tion among minority members operates only when it is thought as a means to improve
socio-economic perspectives5. On the other hand, when the obstacles to upward mo-
bility are substantial enough, the marginality and the insecurity associated with the
minority group status may induce minority members to choose a higher fertility than
majority members with similar characteristics as a way to self-insure against potential
discriminations.
We develop a model of endogenous fertility that gives theoretical support to the
minority status hypothesis. More speciﬁcally, we model an uncertainty mechanism that
has an heterogeneous eﬀect on fertility across groups: we ﬁnd that small minorities
display a lower fertility than comparable majority members, while large minorities
exhibit a higher fertility rate6. This theory has been tested in several empirical studies
but, to our knowledge, it has never been investigated in a theoretical framework7. We
5In a study about Chinese American women, Espenshade and Ye (1994) explain the lower fertility of this
ethnic group with the sacriﬁcial eﬀort in their pursuit of social and economic equality.
6This result is not in contradiction with Hondroyannnis (2010) as he documents a negative average eﬀect
of aggregate uncertainty on total fertility rates, while we are looking at the heterogeneous eﬀect of uncertainty
on completed fertility for diﬀerent groups. It could perfectly be the case that these heterogeneous eﬀects net
out and give a negative overall eﬀect, but this is not the scope of our paper.
7See Sly (1970), Roberts and Lee (1974), Jiobu and Marshall (1975), Johnson and Nishida (1980), Boyd
4revisit the question of why fertility behaviors and educational decisions appear to vary
systematically across ethnic groups. We assess the possibility that diﬀerences in fertility
across groups remain even though their socio-economic characteristics are similar. In
this work we claim that a way to obtain these persistent fertility diﬀerences is to take
into account uncertainty about future earnings or expected socio-economic conditions
of children.
The data on completed fertility by race and hispanic origin and educational attain-
ment shown in Table 1 seem to support this hypothesis. Indeed, on the one hand, for
low levels of education, all the minority groups exhibit a higher fertility than the White.
On the other hand, for higher levels of education, some groups still exhibit a higher
fertility (the Hispanic) while others adopted a fertility rate that is similar to that of
the majority or even lower (the Black and the Asian respectively). Notice that the
data also clearly shows the interdependency between fertility and education: the more
educated women are, the lower the fertility rate.
Table 1: Children ever born per 1000 women aged 35-44 by race and hispanic origin and
educational attainment of mothers in the U.S. 2006.
Education White Asian Hispanic Black
...Total 1.764 1.765 2.286 1.978
...Not high school graduated 2.197 2.689 2.758 2.735
...High school (4 years) 1.860 1.905 2.244 2.105
...Some college (no degree) 1.829 1.848 1.970 1.827
...Bachelor degree 1.626 1.596 1.834 1.648
Source: US Census Bureau, Current Population Survey, 2006.
In our economy, parents decide on their number of children and on the education
level of each child. We take a standard model of endogenous fertility, to which we add
that parents care about the future earnings of their children. Unlike the existing litera-
ture, this paper stresses the role of uncertainty and in particular of the insecurity about
the expected economic status of children8. Assuming that this uncertainty depends on
(1994).
8Some papers already introduced uncertainty in endogenous fertility models, but, to our knowledge, the
5the size of one’s group allows to infer that minority status has an independent eﬀect on
parental behavior. To this purpose, we model labor market outcomes of children as a
restricted pool matching process. It provides ﬁrst a convenient link between the level of
uncertainty and the size of the group and furthermore fairly general conclusions as ran-
dom matching is nothing but a particular case of the restricted pool matching. We use
a logarithmic utility function, which allows us to cancel out the eﬀect of parental human
capital on fertility decisions in order to focus on the risk mechanism. Furthermore, this
formulation implies that our agents are prudent in the sense of Kimball (1990), meaning
that facing risk, they have a precautionary demand, here for children. We show that the
risk term associated to the matching process displays an inverted U-shaped relationship
with respect to the size of one’s group, meaning that the risk is perceived to be the
highest for groups of intermediate size. Consequently, as fertility serves as an insur-
ance mechanism, it also displays the same inverted U-shaped relationship. We compare
this result to the example of the U.S.: large enough minorities (Black and Hispanic)
have higher fertility than White, while Asian have a lower fertility. As a result, this
paper formulates a contribution to the theoretical literature on endogenous fertility:
we argue that non-convergence in the socio-economic characteristics might not be the
only determinant of persistent fertility gaps. We claim that minority membership may
inﬂuence fertility and educational investment behaviors in various directions, which
constitutes a theoretical support of the minority status hypothesis. We link group size
and uncertainty about future economic status of the children and introduce the fact
that this uncertainty may inﬂuence fertility decisions. Section 2 introduces the static
model, while section 3 solves the dynamics. Section 4 gives a parametrization of the
model for the U.S. case. Section 5 concludes.
uncertainty focuses on the survival rate, never on the expected economic status of children.
62 The Model
2.1 The Certainty Case
Let us take a simple OLG model of endogenous fertility with uncertainty, as given
for instance in Kalemli-Ozcan (2003), where, instead of the survival rate, we consider
the future wage rate of children as stochastic. Parents maximize their lifetime utility
choosing their own consumption ct, the number of oﬀsprings nt and the schooling
time per child rt, given an ad hoc altruism parameter γ. Let us assume a production
function that is linear in human capital, as it is often assumed in this literature. The
labor market is competitive, so that agents act as price takers with respect to the wage
rate per unit of human capital. Future earnings of the children, denoted Wi,t+1, are
therefore well captured by the expression ht+1we
t+1, where ht+1 is the human capital of
children and we
t+1 their expected wage rate per unit of human capital. Parents decide
how much time they devote to the labor market and to raising children. Bearing a child
implies a ﬁxed time cost φ ∈ [0,1] while the time spent on education per child, r, is
chosen by parents. Human capital of children is produced according to the technology
described in equation (3), where ψ and τ are strictly positive parameters whose sum is
less or equal than 1 so that returns to parental human capital and education are non
increasing and η is a strictly positive multiplier.
max
ct,nt,rt
(1 − γ)ln(ct) + γ ln(Wt+1) (1)
s.t.










As the expected wage rate per unit of human capital is a priori equal for all children
of the same family, we obtain that children of the same cohort are identical. We can
therefore write Wt+1 = ntht+1we
t+1. Furthermore, we treat nt as a continuous variable.
We do so for convenience and without loss of generality. Indeed a continuous fertility
7may be interpreted as the average of the (discrete) optimal fertilities of all members of an
heterogeneous group (in terms of wealth for instance). Our results remain valid insofar
as the mechanism we propose has a constant eﬀect on fertility along the heterogeneous
dimension.
Taking the ﬁrst order conditions and checking that the second order conditions are











Notice that optimal decisions do not depend on parental human capital nor expected
wage rate. The intuition is straightforward (and was already given by Kalemli-Ozcan
(2003) about the survival probability) in the sense that any exogenous change in we
t+1
represents a change in the price of having a well-oﬀ children and this price change
has two contradicting eﬀects: income and substitution, which exactly cancel out with
logarithmic utility functions. This means that we do not observe a quality/quantity
trade-oﬀ in the sense that more educated parents will not prefer having less children in
order to educate them more, at least as long as we
t+1 is certain9. Studying the logarith-
mic utility case cancels out the eﬀect of parental human capital on optimal decisions and
allows us to focus essentially on the role of uncertainty on diﬀerential fertility. Another
feature of the logarithmic utility function is that agents in our model are prudent in the
sense of Kimball (1990), which implies that agents have a precautionary behavior10.
9The logarithmic formulation implies that a ﬁxed fraction of parental time (and thus income) is devoted to
children, so that consumption is never aﬀected. Furthermore, if the price of a well-oﬀ children falls (through
an increase in the expected wage rate), the relative price of education with respect to child bearing has not
changed, which is why the trade-oﬀ between quality and quantity of children is not aﬀected by the expected
outcome on the labour market and that optimal decisions remain the same.
10This feature certainly constrains our results in the sense that we rule out the possibility that, facing a
greater risk, parents would decide to decrease their demand for children, but generalizing our model to a less
speciﬁc utility function would require further research.
82.2 Uncertainty and Matching in the Labor Market
Let us now introduce uncertainty assuming we
t+1 is a random variable. We consider
that the economy is populated by several groups (be they ethnic, cultural, religious
etc.). Everyone needs to match someone in the society in order to produce output
and get paid, which represents a reasonable assumption about the job market. The
production function is assumed to be linear in own human capital and to depend on the
quality of the match. Everyone matches somebody with probability one, but we assume
individuals may be biased towards matching someone belonging to their own group.
Indeed, it is now established that networks play an important role in the job seeking
process11. These networks usually appear within a given community. This is why, as
in intermarriage models12, agents will ﬁrst try to match someone from their group and,
only in a second attempt, they will match anybody in the society. More speciﬁcally,
there is an exogenous probability π that an individual matches in the restricted pool
of coworkers from the same group, in which case the outcome is µs. With probability
1−π instead, an agent of group i matches anybody in the society, that is someone from
the same group with probability (1 − xi), where xi represents the proportion of non-i
agents in the society, and someone from another group with probability xi, in which
case the wage rate is µd.
we = µd + (µs − µd)X where X ∼ Bern(π + (1 − π)(1 − xi))
where π proxies the bias towards own group and xi is the proportion of non-i agents in
the society. The wage rate per unit of human capital is therefore a linear transformation
of a Bernoulli distribution with probability π+(1−π)(1−xi). We interpret a high value
of π as a situation in which there are less opportunities and/or more costs for two agents
from diﬀerent groups to match, due to physical or cultural distance. For instance, it is
often considered in labor economics that language creates an extra cost to match outside
one’s own group. Lang (1986) shows that a competitive labor market tends to minimize
communication costs through segregation. Wi thus becomes a linear transformation of
11See Simon and Warner, (1992).
12See Bisin and Verdier (2000).






= ht+1(ntµd + (µs − µd)Y )
where Y ∼ B(nt,π + (1 − π)(1 − xi))
Y follows a binomial distribution and gives the number of children that will get an
intragroup match. We then derive the expected value and variance of Wi:
E(Wi) = ntht+1 [(π + (1 − π)(1 − xi))µs + (1 − π)xiµd]
V (Wi) = nt [ht+1(µs − µd)]
2 (π + (1 − π)(1 − xi))(1 − π)xi
This follows directly from the use of Bienayme’s formula for the variance of the sum
of uncorrelated random variables13. Notice that the variance is an inverted U-shaped
function in xi (as the variance of a binomial law is with respect to the probability
of success). Intuitively, it means that, under some conditions that will become clear
later on, the large majorities and small minorities will experience smaller variances.
Following Kalemli-Ozcan (2003), we use the Delta method to solve the maximization
program deﬁned by (1), (2), (3) and (4), where Wi,t+1 is now a stochastic component.
Speciﬁcally we take a Taylor approximation of the expected utility around its mean.
Dropping the time subscripts for convenience, we get:
















10Now, taking the expected value of the above expression, we obtain:
E[U(Wi)] = U(E[Wi]) +










γ(µs − µd)2(π + (1 − π)(1 − xi))(1 − π)xi
2ni [(π + (1 − π)(1 − xi))µs + (1 − π)xiµd]
2





γ(µs − µd)2(π + (1 − π)(1 − xi))(1 − π)xi
2[(π + (1 − π)(1 − xi))µs + (1 − π)xiµd]
2 .
The expected value of the diﬀerence between a random variable and its mean is
zero, that of the square of this diﬀerence is its variance. The second term consequently
cancels out, while the third remains, representing the risk eﬀect. Notice that, due to
the logarithmic formulation, the two ﬁrst terms of (7) are equivalent to the utility in
the certainty case. The only diﬀerence is therefore the last term that represents the
risk. It is composed of a function of the size of the rest of the population, f(xi), that
is always positive, because it is a variance divided by the square of an expected value,
over ni. One may already observe that agents will increase ni in order to reduce the
risk term and that this increase in ni will be positively correlated to f(xi). This simple
model thus proposes an economic mechanism that links fertility and the composition
of the population through uncertainty.
Proposition 1 The fertility obtained maximizing the expected utility (7) (under uncer-
tainty) is always greater or equal than the one that maximizes the utility under certainty.
There exists a threshold ¯ x =
µs
(1 − π)(µd + µs)
∈ [0,1] in size of the remaining popula-




11Proof Let us take the ﬁrst order conditions of the maximization of the expected utility




(1 − γ)(φ + ri)










nt(rt + φ) − 1
= 0 (9)
Solving (9) for ri gives:
ri =
γτ(1 − niφ)
ni(1 − γ(1 − τ))
(10)
From which we observe that ri and ni are necessarily inversely correlated. Then sub-
stituting into (8):
2φn2




Taking the discriminant ∆ = [γ(φf(xi) − 2(1 − τ))]2 + 8φγf(xi), one may observe it is
always strictly positive and that there are two solutions of opposite sign. We keep the
positive one and write the optimal fertility choice as follows:
n∗∗
i =
−γ[φf(xi) − 2(1 − τ)] +
p
[γ(φf(xi) − 2(1 − τ))]2 + 8φγf(xi)
4φ
(11)
First, notice that in the case µs = µd, the uncertainty disappears as the outcome
becomes certain. Furthermore, observe that in this case f(xi) = 0 and the FOCs of
the problem under uncertainty amount to those under certainty. It therefore follows
that optimal decisions are the same in this case. As soon as µs  = µd, then f(xi) > 0
as it is a variance over the square of an expected value. And one may observe from
(11) that n∗∗ is necessarily greater than n∗, because as f(xi) increases, the square root
term becomes greater in absolute value than the ﬁrst term of the numerator, which is
always negative. The ﬁrst part of Proposition 1 is therefore prooved. Using the same
argument, we can say that n∗∗ varies in the same direction as f(xi).







γ(µs − µd)2π(1 − π)





(1 − π)γ(µd − µs)2[(1 − π)xi(µd + µs) − µs]
2((1 − π)xi(µd − µs) + µs)3
12The sign of the derivative depends only on the term (1 − π)xi(µd + µs) − µs, as
the rest is necessarily positive. We therefore have that the derivative is nil for ¯ x =
µs
(1 − π)(µd + µs)
, strictly positive (respectively negative) for x < ¯ x (respectively x >
¯ x). f is consequently an inverted U-shaped function of xi over [0,1] if and only if
¯ x ∈ (0,1), i.e. π <
µd
µs+µd (because ¯ x ≥ 0, so the only restriction is on the upper
bound).
Under uncertainty, only a risk term is added to the utility function with respect to
the certainty case. This risk term is an inverted-U shaped function of xi and monoton-
ically decreasing in nt. So fertility has a similar inverted-U shape with respect to xi.
Intuitively, this result comes from the fact that the risk term is driven by the variance
of the Binomial process determining the labor market outcome. For a very small (re-
spectively very large) group, the probability of an intergroup (respectively intragroup)
match is very high and therefore there is little variability in the outcome. Instead,
for average size groups, both types of matches are likely to happen, which increases
unambiguously the variability of the outcome with respect to the previous situation.
As the number of children represents also the number of draws in the matching process,
parents react to a higher risk by increasing fertility. In other words, the uncertainty on
the labor market is perceived diﬀerently by agents from diﬀerent groups, as suggested
by the Minority Status Hypothesis, which induces diﬀerent fertility behaviors.
3 Dynamics
Given initial conditions on human capital, hi,0, and on population share xi,0, an in-
tertemporal equilibrium is a sequence of temporary equilibria of the static problem
deﬁned by equations (10) and (11) that satisﬁes for all t ≥ 0 and all i the following
laws of motion:




xi,t+1 ≡ χ(xi,t) =
xi,t¯ ni,t
xi,tni,t + (1 − xi,t)ni,t
(13)
where ni,t represents the average fertility of the other groups in the society. Notice that
xi,t+1 is a function of xi,t, ¯ ni,t and the parameters while ht+1 depends on xi,t, ht and
13the parameters.
Let us now study the two-group case in order for us to derive analytically the steady
states and their stability properties. xi,t+1 boils down to a function of xi,t only. Indeed,
in the two-group case, ni,t depends only on xi,t while, in a N group generalization, it
would depend also on the relative sizes of the other groups14. From equation (18), one
may see that for xi to be at a steady state, one needs xi = 0 or xi = 1 or ni = ¯ ni. For
this last equality to occur in the two-group case, it is necessary and suﬃcient that the
risk term be the same for the two groups. Indeed, agents from the two groups then solve
the same problem and necessarily have the same fertility. We therefore have that x∗
i is
a steady state if and only if x∗
i = 0, x∗
i = 1 or x∗
i is such that f(x∗
i) = f(1 − x∗
i). We
are looking for the intersections over [0,1] between two inverted-U shaped functions
that are symmetric with respect to 1/2. Recall that f(xi) starts at 0 (for xi = 0),
increases and reaches a maximum at ¯ x and then decreases to a strictly positive limit at
xi = 1. We therefore have only two possible cases: either ¯ x > 1/2, in which case, the
two functions intersect only once for x = 1/2, or ¯ x < 1/2 and then f(xi) and f(1− xi)
would intersect three times: x1 < 1/2, 1/2 and x2 > 1/2. Notice than ¯ x = 1/2 if and
only if µs = µd, which we rule out because it amounts to the certainty case.
(i) ¯ x > 1/2 (illustrated in the left panel of Figure 1)
f(xi) starts at 0 and increases monotonically until reaching a maximum at ¯ x then
decreases to f(1) > 0, while f(1 − xi) is the symmetric graph with respect to
x = 1/2. We therefore have that f(xi) < f(1 − xi) for xi < ¯ x, while the opposite
holds for the other side, and the only intersection is for xi = 1 − xi = 1/2.
Consequently, ni < ¯ ni (respectively >) to the left (respectively right) of ¯ x. We
infer from (13) that χ(xi) > xi (respectively <) for xi < ¯ x (respectively >). From
which we conclude that 1/2 is a globally stable steady state.
14Whatever the number of groups, it is noticeable from equation (13) that the only way to have a society
divided into steady shares is that either one group tends to 1 and all the others to 0 or fertility of the various
groups should be equal. In this latter case, the risk term should be the same for all groups and thus they
should all be of equal size. We are thus able to say that a one-group society or a society divided among
groups of equal size are potential steady states. It is however very diﬃcult to derive more analytical results
with more than two groups.
14(ii) ¯ x < 1/2 (illustrated in the right panel of Figure 1)
Over [0,1/2], f(xi) increases from 0 to its maximum and then decreases towards
f(1/2), while f(1 − xi) increases monotonically from f(1) > 0 to f(1/2). By
continuity, f(xi) and f(1 − xi) need to have crossed at x1 ∈ (0,1/2). The same
reasoning may be applied symmetrically over the interval [1/2,1] to obtain x2 ∈
(1/2,1) such that f(x2) = f(1 − x2). We can therefore infer that ni > ¯ ni and
consequently χ(xi) < xi over (x1,1/2) ∪ (x2,1), while the opposite holds over
(0,x1) ∪ (1/2,x2). From which we conclude that x1 (respectively x2) is a stable
steady state over the interval (0,1/2) (respectively (1/2,1)), while 0, 1/2 and 1
are unstable.














We therefore derive the following proposition:
Proposition 2 The dynamics of xi converges to 1/2 if and only if ¯ x > 1/2. If ¯ x < 1/2
then xi converges to x1 (respectively x2) for an initial value xi,0 < 1/2 (respectively >).
Proof Proposition 2 stems directly from the previous discussion.
Once we have solved for the population share, the remaining problem concerning
human capital is straightforward. Indeed, the long-run value for human capital depends
only on the population share and the parameters. From Proposition 1, we know that
fertility and education vary in opposite direction following a shock on the parameters.
15We thus observe a dynamics of opposite direction for human capital as the group shares
evolve towards the steady state.
The bifurcation occurs as the top of the inverted-U of f(xi) is shifted from the left
to the right of 1/2. It means that if π, µs and µd are such that the maximum of f(xi)
occurs for sizes of the remaining population greater than 1/2 (that is for groups smaller
than half the population) then the f of the small group is always higher than that of
the large group. The small group thus has a higher fertility and catches up with the
majority. If the maximum of f(xi) occurs instead for sizes of the remaining population
smaller than 1/2 (that is for a majority group), then we observe a distinct steady states
for each group. The initially large one converges towards x1 < 1/2, while the initially
small to x2 = 1 − x1 > 1/2. This is intuitively because in this case small majorities
have a higher f than large minorities, inducing the group sizes to diverge until f for
majorities eventually decreases and crosses that of the minority.
4 Parametrization
The theoretical results in the previous sections show that persistent diﬀerences in fertil-
ity may be explained through other channels than diﬀerences in socio-economic charac-
teristics. Indeed, in our model, fertility relies on how parents perceive the uncertainty
about the job market opportunities their children will face. In this section, we con-
struct a numerical example that aims at replicating qualitatively the fertility behaviors
and group shares of the US society. We ﬁrst calibrate the ”traditional” parameters
and then ﬁnd values for the remaining parameters that allow to replicate the ranking
of fertility diﬀerences across ethnic groups. As already stated, we ignore the eﬀect of
human capital and income on fertility. For this reason, this exercise constitutes rather
a parametrization of our model that allows to assess what might be the extent of the
channel we illustrate here than a proper calibration.
We extend the model to four groups (White, Black, Hispanic and Asian). The only
heterogeneity comes from the size of each group within the society. According to the
U.S.Census (2006), we observe the following group shares: white, 0.687, black, 0.128,
hispanic, 0.143, asian, 0.041. Our model is parametrized so that a period has a length
16of 30 years. The time cost parameter φ for bearing a child is set to 0,075 based on
the evidence in Haveman and Wolfe (1995) according to which the time cost of having
a child is approximatively 15% of a parent’s time endowment. If we assume that a
child lives 15 years with the parents, this opportunity cost amounts to 15% of 15 years,
which represent 7,5% of a parent’s total time endowment. The return to parental time
τ is calibrated in de la Croix and Doepke (2003). While they set τ = 0.635, we let
τ vary from the value of 0.600 to 0.705 in order to observe the eﬀect of the return to
parental time on the fertility behaviors of diﬀerent groups. In our model, we know
that agents will spend optimally γ percent of their income on children and the rest on
consumption. We therefore choose γ to match the ratio of expenditures on education
over total expenditures (expenditures on private consumption plus on education). We
obtain roughly γ = 0.18.
For every value of τ, we then choose the µ in order to ﬁt the observed fertility for





[ni(µs,µd) − ˜ ni]
2
where ˜ ni are the observed fertilities. The minimization gives us respectively for
τ = 0.6, µs = 1.691 and µd = 1.062, for τ = 0.635, µs = 1.991 and µd = 0.882, for
τ = 0.67, µs = 2.284 and µd = 0.837, for τ = 0.705, µs = 2.465 and µd = 0.783. As
we can observe, the gap needed between the expected outcome of an intergroup and an
intragroup match is increasing in the return to parental time. Figure 2 plots the risk
term in function of xi for these scenarios.
As already discussed in the previous sections, the relation between the risk term
and the size of the other group has an inverted U-shape. Observe that the risk term
shifts up as we switch to a higher τ scenario. The reason is that the gap between intra
and intergroup match given by the minimization program is positively related to the
return on parental time. This enlarged gap allows the risk term to ﬂuctuate more which
makes our mechanism quantitatively more plausible.
Given the parameter values, we are able to compute the fertilities predicted by the
model. As shown in table 2 we obtain the correct ranking of fertilities if τ is high
enough. Obviously we are not able to match precisely the observed fertilities, but we








can say that if returns to parental time are important enough, our mechanism may
explain non-negligible diﬀerences in fertility across groups without taking into account
any eﬀect of socio-economic characteristics.
Table 2: Predicted fertility
τ white black hispanic asian
0.600 2.004 1.996 2.000 1.950
0.635 1.972 2.036 2.052 1.882
0.670 1.900 2.064 2.084 1.830
0.705 1.804 2.088 2.110 1.792
data 1.765 2.003 2.300 1.684
5 Conclusion
The aim of this paper was to study the fertility and educational investment diﬀeren-
tials between racial and ethnic minorities within an endogenous fertility framework that
explicitly accounts for uncertainty about future earnings or expected socio-economic
18conditions. The analysis led to three main conclusions. First, our model may be in-
terpreted as a theoretical support of the minority status hypothesis according to which
minority members usually have a higher fertility facing low potential for social mobil-
ity but may in some instances strategically decrease their fertility. This mechanism
arises from the fact that the insecurity associated with the minority status may inﬂu-
ence individuals expectations about potential social mobility. Second, unlike previous
results in the literature, we observed the possibility of persistent diﬀerences in fertil-
ity and educational investment even though socio-economic characteristics of parents
are equivalent. Indeed, we link uncertainty about future earnings to the size of one’s
group and ﬁnd that the risk associated has an inverted U-shape with respect to the
size of one’s group. As we model fertility as an insurance device, we obtain that large
majorities and small minorities may both have a lower fertility and higher educational
investment than intermediate size groups. Third, a parametrization exercise for the
model shows that our model may qualitatively reproduce observed diﬀerences in fer-
tility, although the eﬀect of socio-economic characteristics on fertility is not modeled.
Including an interaction between fertility and educational investment decisions may
help to reproduce more closely the data. Finally, a natural extension of this article
would be to incorporate the eﬀect of parental human capital on fertility in order to
quantitatively assess the respective importance of socio-economic characteristics versus
minority status as determinants of diﬀerences in fertility.
19References
Bean,F.D., Marcum J.P., 1978. Diﬀerential Fertility and the Minority Group Status
Hypothesis: An Assessment and Review. In Bean, F.D. and and Frisbie, W.P.,, eds.,
The Demography of Racial and Ethnic Groups, New York: Academic Press: 189-211.
Bean, F.D., Swicegood, G.C., 1985. Mexican American Fertility Patterns. Austin: Uni-
versity of Texas Press.
Bisin, A., Verdier, T., 2000. Beyond the Melting Pot: Cultural Transmission, Marriage
and the Evolution of Ethnic and Religious Traits. Quarterly Journal of Economics,
115: 955-988.
Boyd, R.L., 1994. Educational Mobility and the Fertility of Black and White Women.
Population Research and Policy Review 13: 275-281.
De la Croix, D., Doepke M., 2003. Inequality and Growth: Why Diﬀerential Fertility
Matters. American Economic Review, 93(4): 1091-1113.
De la Croix, D., Doepke M., 2004. Public versus private education when diﬀerential
fertility matters. Journal of Development Economics, 73(2): 607-629.
Espenshade, T.J., Ye, W., 1994. Diﬀerential Fertility within an Ethnic Minority: the
Eﬀect of ”Trying Harder” among Chinese-American Women. The Social Problems,
41(1): 97-113.
Goldscheider, C., Uhlenberg P.R., 1969. Minority Group Status and Fertility. American
Journal of Sociology, 74(1): 361-72.
Gordon, M.M., 1964. Assimilation in American Life. New York: Oxford University
Press.
Gordon, M.M., 1978. Human Nature, Class and Ethnicity. New York: Oxford University
Press.
Haveman, R.H., Wolfe, B., 1995. The Determinants of Children’s Attainments: A Re-
view of Methods and Findings. Journal of Economic Literature, 33(4): !829-1878.
20Hondroyiannis, G., 2010. Fertility Determinants and Economic Uncertainty: An As-
sessment Using European Panel Data. Journal of Family and Economic Issues, 31,
33 50.
Jiobu, R., Marshall, H., 1977. Minority Status and Family Size: A comparison of
Explanations. Population Studies, 31(3): 509-517.
Johnson, N.E., Nishida, R., 1980. Minority-group Status and Fertility: A Study of
Japanese and Chinese in Hawaii and California. American Journal of Sociology, 86(3):
498-511.
Kalemli-Ozcan, S., 2003. A Stochastic Model of Mortality, Fertility, and Human Capital
Investment. Journal of Development Economics 70(1): 103-118.
Kimball, M. S., 1990. Precautionary Saving in the Small and in the Large. Economet-
rica, vol. 58(1), pages 53-73, January.
Ryder, N.B., 1973. Recent Trends and Group Diﬀerences in Fertility. In Toward the
End of Growth. Population in America. Englewood Cliﬀs, New York: Prentice Hall.
Roberts, R.E., Lee, E.S., 1974. Minority-group Status and Fertility Revisited. American
Journal of Sociology, 80(2): 503-523.
Simon, C.J., Warner, J.T., 1992. Matchmaker, matchmaker: the eﬀect of old boy net-
works on job match quality, earnings, and tenure. Journal of Labour Economics,
10(3): 306-330.
Sly, D.F., 1970. Minority-Group Status and Fertility: An Extension of Goldscheider
and Uhlenberg. American Journal of Sociology, 76(11): 443-459
Trovato, F., 1987. A Macrosociological Analysis of Native Indian Fertility in Canada:
1961, 1971 and 1981. Social Forces, 66(2): 463-485.
21ISSN 1379-244X D/2011/3082/005